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In the last few weeks, and especially given the EU’s remarkable success in keeping
European annoyance at (alleged) British rule-breaking out of the negotiation room,
little more has been said about the infringement action launched by the Commission
against the UK at the beginning of October for failure to fulfil obligations under EU
law in relation to the Withdrawal Agreement.  However, not only has this not gone
away, but the recent ratcheting up of ‘no deal’ tensions means that a claim may
soon be made on the so-called insurance policy (the controversial clauses in the UK
Internal Market Bill), turning the threatened breach into an actual one.  After the Bill
becomes law, and assuming that the controversial clauses remain, a minister may
use those clauses to pass a statutory instrument, for example, forbidding any checks
to be carried out on goods travelling from Great Britain into Northern Ireland.  Some
would argue that the threat is bad enough and itself justifies an infringement action. 
That may be so.  However, the Commission’s action is still premature.
Let’s have a quick recapitulation.  On 9 September, the UK government tabled
its Internal Market Bill.  This contained a number of provisions that ‘overwrite’ the
Protocol on Ireland/ Northern Ireland which is attached to the Withdrawal Agreement.
  By these provisions, British ministers would be allowed to countermand EU law
related to Northern Ireland, contrary to the Agreement’s Article 4, which guarantees
that related EU law would remain supreme.  Despite being asked by the EU, the
UK refused to withdraw the contested provisions by the end of September, which
led, on 1 October, to the European Commission sending the UK a so-called ‘letter
of formal notice.’  This is the first step in the EU’s infringement procedure and, in
addition to stating the Commission’s belief that the UK is failing to fulfil its obligations
under EU law (which continue through the transition period), the letter will also have
set out in detail the alleged infraction.  So far as we know from a Commission press
release, this is specifically the failure to withdraw the problematic provisions in the
Internal Market Bill, but also more generally in relation to the implementation of the
Withdrawal Agreement, the failure to act in good faith, as enshrined in Article 5.  It
should be noted that Article 5 is in broadly similar terms to Article 4(3) of the Treaty
on European Union, usually referred to as the principle of sincere cooperation.  This
could be important as, according to Article 87 of the Agreement, the Commission’s
power to sue the UK is only in relation to breaches ‘under the Treaties or under Part
Four of this Agreement.’  Part Four, it should be observed, only covers Articles 126
to 132 inclusive.  The Commission may thus still need a Treaty ‘hook’ on which to
hang their alleged breach.
On receipt of the letter, the UK will have chance to convince the Commission that it
is mistaken or to remedy the matter in a way that is satisfactory to the Commission.
  Often infringement procedures end at this point.  However, given the improbability
of both outcomes, this conciliatory, administrative stage of the procedure could well
evolve into a more serious, litigation stage.  If the UK refuses to put an end to the
infringement (be it the granting of the power to the minister or the minister’s actual
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use thereof), it will only remain for the Commission to definitively set out the ‘charge’
against the UK in a document called a ‘reasoned opinion.’  The reasoned opinion
also sets a deadline by which the defendant State is expected to comply – on pain
of a lawsuit – and this sets the clock counting down to a potential hearing at the
Court of Justice.  It is worth mentioning that at that stage the Commission could also
apply to the Court to order the UK to suspend the legislation pending delivery of the
judgment.  The Withdrawal Agreement would then need to be complied with in full
until the main proceedings were over.
So far so uncontroversial.  However, in an Order from 2000, the Court made it clear
that draft measures may not be the object of infringement proceedings.  The case in
quo was an enforcement action brought by the Commission against the Netherlands
in relation to some legislation about oysters.  The Commission was concerned
that this legislation might inhibit the free movement of goods from other oyster-
producing Member States.  However, thanks to arrangements under a famous law
dating back to the creation of the Single Market in 1992, known as the ‘Technical
Standards Directive,’ the Commission’s preliminary comments on the matter related
to the draft Dutch law, not the law as subsequently adopted.  When the Commission
attempted to convince the Court that these comments amounted to a letter of formal
notice, thus initiating the infringement proceeding, the Court disagreed, stating that
a letter of formal notice must allege a prior failure by the Member State concerned
to fulfil an obligation owed by it.  At the moment that the Netherlands received the
Commission’s comments, the State ‘cannot have infringed Community law, since
the measure exist[ed] only in draft form.’  The Court refused to countenance such a
thing as ‘conditional formal notice,’ conditional that is on the draft law being passed
unamended, as this would offend against legal certainty.
This Order is still good law and has been referred back to in a handful of subsequent
cases, in various different contexts.  As one of the Advocates General helpfully
put it in a proceeding against France, the infringement action is not a progressive
procedure, but a repressive one.
Returning then to the current purported action against the UK, the conclusion must
be that the Commission has jumped the gun, and that the action as it stands would
not be admissible.  The Court’s finding is clear – a breach of EU Law, if there is
one, follows national promulgation – and this finding would apply wherever draft
measures were impugned, as in the case of the UK Internal Market Bill.  Could it be
argued that, where a breach of the duty of good faith was alleged, this could occur
earlier, for example, when the draft is published?  This would be a stretch.  Unless
EU Law itself intrudes into what one might call the ‘pre-promulgation’ sphere, as for
example where it imposes a notification requirement, then anything that happens in
that sphere would normally be regarded as a matter of national competence only.
  There is of course copious discussion in the literature about the doctrine of pre-
emption.  However, the most that could be said is that there may be a separate duty
of abstention triggered by the passage of an act of Union law, but that this distinct
duty of abstention would similarly only be breached on enactment, not on proposal.
Nor does this have to do with the question, alluded to several times at second
reading in the House of Commons, as to whether the UK would already be breaching
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EU Law by providing ministers with the controversial override powers, or whether it
would only be breaching EU Law as and when such powers were employed.  The
fact is that, even in the former case, a breach only occurs once the Internal Market
Act (as it would then be) receives Royal Assent with that provision intact, and, with
second reading in the Lords only having just begun on 19 October, this has clearly
not happened yet.
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